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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Shortly prior to her marriage to David Litowitz, Becky Litowitz 
had a hysterectomy, rendering her unable to achieve pregnancy and 
give birth to a child.1 While Becky and David already had a child, 
they wanted to have more children during their marriage.2 To fulfill 
their dreams of expanding their family, Becky and David resolved to 
use artificial reproductive technology (ART).3 Becky and David un-
derwent in vitro fertilization (IVF) therapy, during which eggs re-
ceived from a donor were combined with David’s sperm to create five 
embryos, two of which were cryogenically preserved.4 
                                                                                                                      
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University School of Law. The author would 
like to thank Leslie Bender and Cynthia Ho for reading prior versions of this Article and  
providing helpful comments. The author would also like to thank Roberta Mitchell and 
Mark Strasser for sharing their thoughts on these complex issues. Finally, the author 
would like to thank Debra Auten for her research assistance and Capital University School 
of Law for its financial support. 
 1. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 262 (Wash. 2002) (en banc), amended by In re of 
Marriage of Litowitz, 53 P.3d 576 (2002). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. At the point of cryopreservation, the sperm and ovum have joined to create a 
one-cell zygote.  John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 
76 VA. L. REV. 437, 441 (1990).  This zygote is “a new and unique genome” created from the 
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 Three of the Litowitzes’ embryos were implanted in a surrogate 
mother who became pregnant with the Litowitzes’ daughter.5 Prior to 
their daughter’s birth, however, Becky and David separated.6 During 
dissolution of marriage proceedings, David requested that the trial 
court permit him to donate the two remaining cryogenically pre-
served embryos to another couple who could use the embryos in the 
hopes of parenting any resulting children.7 Becky, however, asked 
the court to award the embryos to her so that she could have them 
implanted in a surrogate and raise any resulting children herself.8 
Despite the protests of both Becky and David, the Litowitz court 
strictly interpreted a cryopreservation contract signed by Becky and 
David when they first began IVF treatment and concluded that the 
embryos were to be thawed and discarded.9  
 Becky and David’s story is not unique.10 Rather, it exposes the dif-
ficulties courts face in resolving disputes between progenitors who no 
longer agree about whether to use cryogenically stored embryos to 
achieve parenthood. “Custody” disputes over these embryos raise 
several interesting questions: Should an embryo dispute ever be re-
solved in a manner that is contrary to the decisions of both progeni-
tors? Are constraining principles of contract interpretation applicable 
in such disputes? Is the progenitor’s inability to have future biologi-
cal children relevant in resolving the dispute over the embryos? 
What significance, if any, does the biological connectivity between 
the progenitor and any resulting children have in the resolution of 
the dispute? This Article posits that difficulties in arriving at satis-
factory answers to these questions lie in the adversarial process it-
self. 
 Under an adversarial model, the court must assign a legal status 
to the embryo. Such a determination is imperative, as it will deter-
mine the progenitors’ and the court’s authority over the embryo and 
dictate the possible options for resolution of the dispute. For exam-
ple, should the court determine that the embryo is human life, its au-
                                                                                                                      
heredity contribution of both gamete donors. Id. After several cell divisions, the zygote be-
comes an “undifferentiated aggregate of two, four, six, or eight cells.” Id. It is at this point 
that it is cryogenically preserved. Id. at 443; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 
(Tenn. 1992). While this entity is not technically an embryo because it has not been per-
mitted to develop beyond an eight-cell entity, the majority of courts and scholars refer to 
these cells as preembryos. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594. This Article will refer to these en-
tities as “embryos” or “frozen embryos.” 
 5. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262. 
 6. Id. at 264. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 268-71. 
 10. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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thority to direct the destruction of the embryo will be significantly 
limited. By contrast, a determination that the embryo is purely prop-
erty provides the court and the progenitors with more latitude in ar-
riving at possible options for disposition of the embryo. While the ad-
versarial model promotes such determinations, courts have been un-
able to articulate a status for the embryo that provides for a worka-
ble solution to the dispute while simultaneously preserving respect 
for the unique attributes of the embryo.  
 The adversarial model also encourages predictability of resolution 
in future disputes. As the frequency of litigated embryo disputes has 
increased, the demand for predictable resolutions has also risen.11 
Those engaged in providing ART treatment advocate for predictabil-
ity to eliminate any threat to the provision of IVF services by uncer-
tainty in liability from thawing the embryos.12 Progenitors also advo-
cate for predictability in the resolution of embryo disputes to provide 
them with clear direction when they decide to undergo IVF treat-
ment.13  
 Predictability in the resolution of embryo disputes has the advan-
tages of providing progenitors and IVF service providers the ability 
to plan for future disposition options and calculate potential liability. 
The approaches currently adopted by courts to create such predict-
ability, however, are based on overly simplistic assumptions of the 
progenitors’ interests and a limited examination of their intent to en-
gage in IVF.  
 To meet the demand for predictability in embryo disputes, courts 
have adopted two general tests. The first of these tests, known as the 
procreation rights test, relies upon assumptions of the progenitors’ 
interests in procreation and parenthood to determine to which pro-
genitor to award the embryo. This approach is premised on the as-
sumption that the primary underpinning of parenthood is the genetic 
connection between the child and the parent. Courts utilizing this 
approach have relied on this assumption to uniformly award the em-
bryo to the progenitor seeking to avoid its use on the basis that the 
progenitor would become an unwilling parent given his or her bio-
logical connection to any resulting child. While promoting predict-
ability, this assumption of parenthood does not provide an accurate 
basis on which to uniformly award the embryo to the progenitor seek-
ing to avoid its use. The alternative approach adopted by courts is 
similarly flawed. Known as the contract rights model, the second 
general test utilized by courts resolves the dispute according to the 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179.  
 12. See generally John A. Robertson, Pre-commitment Strategies for Disposition of 
Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 991-93 (2001). 
 13. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179 (noting that there is a “need for clear, consistent 
principles to guide parties in protecting their interests and resolving their disputes”). 
398  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:395 
 
intention of the parties as evidenced in any express agreements be-
tween them. While attempting to provide a bright-line guide for the 
courts, this approach is difficult to apply. 
 This Article critically examines the resolution of embryo disputes 
under an adversarial model. The focus on the adversarial model 
permits a deeper evaluation of the inherent limitations of the process 
itself and an exploration of new paradigms to resolve frozen embryo 
disputes. This Article provides a substantial framework for the is-
sues underlying the embryo dispute itself—namely the status of the 
embryo and the role and interests of the progenitors. Building on this 
framework, this Article exposes the often rigid and overly simplistic 
approaches currently utilized by courts in resolving embryo disputes, 
and it advocates that such approaches have led to problematic inter-
pretations of the right to parenthood and procreation. Finally, this 
Article provides an alternative, case-by-case analysis for embryo dis-
putes and suggests that, ultimately, an adversarial dispute resolu-
tion model that permits flexible decisionmaking by the progenitors be 
utilized in embryo disputes. 
 Part II of this Article begins with an introduction of the legal 
statuses currently ascribed to the embryo and examines the ramifica-
tions of these different treatments. Further, Part II explores the rec-
ognized authority of the progenitors over the embryo. Part III pro-
vides an in-depth discussion of the two predominant approaches util-
ized by the courts to resolve embryo disputes between progenitors.  
 Part IV of this Article turns to a discussion of the failures of the 
current legal framework in fully realizing the true nature of the right 
to parenthood and procreation in resolving embryo disputes. Overall, 
Part IV of the Article critiques the role the adversarial model plays 
in reinforcing overly simplistic notions of parenthood and procreation 
and provides a legal framework for courts to better determine the 
true interests of the progenitors in resolution of the embryo dispute. 
Part IV.A begins by critically examining the court’s reliance on the 
primacy of biology in understanding the right to parenthood and pro-
creation. Part IV.B continues the examination of the right to parent-
hood and procreation by exploring the court’s reliance on prior ex-
pressions of intention to parent or procreate.  
 Finally, this Article turns to a discussion of an alternative dispute 
resolution model to resolve embryo disputes in Part V. This Part be-
gins with a discussion of the advantages of an alternative dispute 
resolution model. Part V concludes with a discussion of the ramifica-
tions such a model would have on the recognition of the legal status 
of the embryo, the progenitors’ roles in the resolution process, and 
the progenitors’ interests in procreation and parenthood.  
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II.   EXAMINING THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE DISPUTE: THE EMBRYO 
AND THE PROGENITORS 
 In order to examine the adversarial process as a means of resolv-
ing embryo disputes, the contours of these disputes must first be ex-
amined. The roles and interests of those involved in these disputes 
shape the role of the court in arriving at its determination of whether 
to award decisional authority over the embryo to a party and, if so, to 
whom. This Part of the Article will examine the role of the primary 
entities involved in embryo disputes—the embryo itself and the pro-
genitors. 
A.   The Legal Status of the “Frozen Embryo” 
 As ART improves, more couples are undergoing infertility treat-
ments with the hope of starting a family. Recent studies suggest that 
approximately five to six million American couples are currently pur-
suing various forms of ART.14 One of the most predominant and con-
troversial forms of ART is IVF. During IVF treatments, female and 
male gametes are joined in a laboratory setting and are allowed to 
divide into an eight-cell embryo that is then cryogenically preserved 
so that it may be implanted in a female uterus at a later date.15  New 
advances in IVF procedures have permitted these embryos to be 
stored for longer periods of time.16 As a result, hundreds of thousands 
of cryogenically preserved embryos are currently being stored in fer-
tility clinics in the United States.17 Legal disputes over the “custody” 
of these embryos are on the rise—a trend that likely will continue as 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Wendy Wendland, Adopting Frozen Embryos; More Hope for Infertile Couples, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 2001, at 3; Wendy Wendland-Bowyer, Frozen Hope: A Few Fertility 
Clinics Will Place Available Embryos with Childless Couples, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 19, 
2000, at 6F. The United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention recently reported that approximately 9.3 million women 
are using infertility services. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, SERIES NO. 23, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 19, 7 (1997). 
 15. Robertson, supra note 4, at 443. 
 16. Recent successful use of cryogenically preserved embryos have led IVF providers 
to speculate that embryos can be cryogenically stored for ten to twelve years and still be 
viable for implantation and impregnation. Pacific Fertility Center Lab Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.infertilitydoctor.com/lab/lab_faq.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
The increased potential for use of these embryos increases the possibility that the progeni-
tors will not continue to remain in agreement as to their appropriate disposition. See gen-
erally American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Disposition of Abandoned Embryos, 
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/abandon.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 17. It is now believed that the original estimates of the number of embryos in a cryo-
genic state were grossly underestimated. Recent estimates suggest that there are ap-
proximately 400,000 embryos in cryogenic storage in the United States. LAW & HEALTH 
INITIATIVE, RAND, HOW MANY FROZEN HUMAN EMBRYOS ARE AVAILABLE FOR RESEARCH? 1 
(2003), http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB9038/RB9038.pdf; see also Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Some See New Route to Adoption in Clinics Full of Frozen Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2001, at A1 (discussing the number of embryos available for donation).  
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cryopreservation techniques improve, allowing embryos to be stored 
and remain viable for significantly longer periods of time.18 
 The legal status of these frozen embryos is controversial.19 How-
ever, because the legal status of the frozen embryo will dictate the 
framework for the court’s analysis, such a determination can prove to 
be a watershed decision in disputes that arise among the individuals 
who orchestrated the creation and preservation of the embryo.20 
Moreover, an examination of the legal status of frozen embryos 
within current legal disputes provides insight into the role of the 
court in resolving frozen embryo disputes and in framing the rele-
vant issues to be resolved under an adversarial framework. 
 Currently, there are three predominant characterizations of the 
legal status of a frozen embryo—property,21 property deserving of 
special respect,22 and human life.23 Gametes, the sperm and ovum 
used to create the embryo, are typically considered to be a form of 
property under the law.24 This designation is significant because it 
permits the gamete donors to “decide at their sole discretion the dis-
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Pacific Fertility Center Lab Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 16 (dis-
cussing recent successful use of embryos after more than a decade in cryogenic storage).  
 19. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594-97 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing the contro-
versy over whether an embryo is a person or property); Robertson, supra note 4, at 450-54 
(discussing various ways to characterize the legal nature of the embryo). 
 20. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-97; Robertson, supra note 4, at 450-54; see also 
Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 81-82 (2002) (discussing the basis of the authority progenitors have 
over frozen embryos).  But see Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that 
because the embryo dispute could be resolved by looking to the parties’ prior written direc-
tive, determination of the legal status of the embryo was not required). Arguably, however, 
the conclusion by the Kass court—that the status of the embryo was not relevant to the 
embryo dispute given the binding nature of the progenitors’ prior contract—would not have 
been permitted in a state that gives the embryo the status of personhood. See, e.g., LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, :123 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular Sess. Acts) (defining 
a human embryo as an “in vitro fertilized human” giving it the capacity of a jurisdictional 
person). See infra pages 401-04 for a discussion of the implications of characterizing the 
embryo as human life.  
 21. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-27 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 22. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.  
 23. § 9:123. 
 24. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See 
generally Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Dona-
tion, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107; Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for 
Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological 
Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2004); Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: What 
About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305 (1993); Jill Madden Melchoir, Comment, 
Cryogenically Preserved Embryos in Dispositional Disputes and the Supreme Court: Break-
ing Impossible Ties, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 921 (2000); Donna M. Sheinbach, Comment, Exam-
ining Disputes over Ownership Rights to Frozen Embryos: Will Prior Consent Documents 
Survive If Challenged by State Law and/or Constitutional Principles?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 
989 (1999). 
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position of [the embryos], provided such disposition is within medical 
and ethical guidelines.”25  
 A few courts have held that frozen embryos are similar to gametes 
and have treated them as the joint property of the progenitors. For 
example, the Eastern District of Virginia in York v. Jones concluded 
that a clinic that had refused to release an embryo to its progenitors 
was unlawfully converting the couple’s property.26 The understand-
ing that an embryo is property of the individuals that are genetically 
related to it is also evident in the language of consent forms used in 
ART clinics. These consent forms often state that if the progenitors 
should divorce, marital property laws govern the disposition of the 
frozen embryo.27 
 The characterization of embryos as “property” has significant 
ramifications for the resolution of embryo disputes. Such a charac-
terization would imply that embryo disputes are best resolved under 
traditional contract and property law principles.28 Accordingly, under 
this view, the only issues germane to the resolution of the embryo 
dispute are those of contract interpretation, traditional challenges to 
enforceability of contracts, and consideration of marital property 
law.29  Any argument the parties have regarding their interest in the 
embryo because of its potential to develop into a human being is 
likely to be construed as irrelevant to the issue of ownership of the 
embryo.30 For these reasons, most courts are reluctant to characterize 
embryos as mere property under the law.31 
 In stark contrast to the approach taken by the York v. Jones court, 
the Louisiana Legislature has adopted legislation that deems frozen 
embryos to be “persons.”32 However, under this statute, embryos lose 
                                                                                                                      
 25. York, 717 F. Supp. at 426 n.5 (quoting THE ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. FERTILITY 
SOC’Y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 89S (1986)). 
 26. Id. at 426-27; see Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Conse-
quences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1144-45 (1997) (discussing 
York). 
 27. See generally Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Con-
sents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 918-32 (2000) (critically examining informed consent forms 
utilized during IVF treatments). 
 28. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 407, 409-10 (1990); Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs—Custody, Control, and Con-
tracts: Allocating Decisional Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 937, 
939 (1999). 
 29. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-81 (N.Y. 1998); see also Sara D. Petersen, Com-
ment, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed 
at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1065 (2003) (advocating that embryo 
disputes be resolved under traditional notions of contract law). 
 30. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178-79.  
 31. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992). 
 32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular Sess. Acts); see 
also Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science 
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the status of person if they fail to develop within thirty-six hours of 
in vitro fertilization.33 Further, the statute directs courts confronted 
with a dispute regarding the embryo that the appropriate judicial 
standard to resolve the dispute is “in the best interest of the in vitro 
fertilized ovum.”34  
 The implications of the Louisiana statute have not been developed 
or discussed by subsequent caselaw. Presumably, under the statute, 
disputes over frozen embryos would mimic custody disputes between 
parents of born children, in which the court makes a determination 
of primary custody based on the consideration of several factors de-
signed to assess the “best interest of the child.”35  
 It is difficult to imagine any court construing the Louisiana stat-
ute in a way that awards an embryo to a progenitor who did not wish 
to implant the embryo. To do so, the court would have to find that be-
ing given the possibility to develop into a fetus and eventually be 
born as a human being would not be in the best interest of the em-
bryo.36 This kind of a determination might be subject to the same 
public policy challenges that traditionally have been asserted against 
wrongful life claims.  
 Wrongful life claims require the plaintiff to show that had his 
mother been properly informed of his disability by a treating physi-
cian, she would have aborted him.37 Courts largely have rejected 
these claims on the grounds that such showings undermine the 
“sanctity and preciousness of human life”38 and force the court to at-
tempt to “weigh the value of being versus nonbeing.”39 It is likely that 
the same public policy challenge would be applicable in embryo dis-
putes if the court were required to apply the standard of “best inter-
est of the embryo” since the court would be forced to weigh the value 
of being versus nonbeing. Consequently, the Louisiana statute ap-
pears to either put the court in an unworkable paradigm or create 
                                                                                                                      
of Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which Govern That Technology, 48 
DEPAUL L. REV. 825, 837-38 (1999) (discussing the Louisiana legislation). 
 33. § 9:129. 
 34. § 9:131.  
 35. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on 
Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1755-56 (1993) (discussing the “best interest of 
the child” standard and noting the difficulties associated with applying this test in child 
custody disputes). 
 36. See § 9:131. 
 37. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 291 (2001). 
 38. Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 68 (S.C. 2004). But see Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life, 
Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Ju-
risdictions Recognize All but One?, 64 MO. L. REV. 29, 30-33 (1999) (arguing that courts 
and legislatures should reconsider their refusal to recognize an action for wrongful life, due 
to the claim’s similarity to wrongful birth and wrongful death, which are more widely rec-
ognized). 
 39. Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 2000) (quoting Bowman v. Davis, 
356 N.E.2d 496, 499 n.3 (Ohio 1976)). 
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the net effect of mandating courts to award an embryo to a progeni-
tor wishing to become a parent using the IVF process over the objec-
tion of the progenitor who, at the time of the dispute, no longer 
wishes to become a biological parent. 
 Similar to the designation of an embryo as property, the designa-
tion of an embryo as a person has significant legal ramifications. Ar-
guably, the only proper analysis for courts to follow in resolving dis-
putes over embryos that are considered “persons” is something simi-
lar to the best interest of the child test.40 While no court has ex-
pressly considered it, the only other appropriate analysis may be to 
view the embryo as a person without legal decisionmaking capacity, 
making a guardianship arrangement appropriate. Given that there is 
no child-in-being at the time of the dispute and the fact that, in most 
disputes, at least one progenitor is opposing implantation of the em-
bryo, either approach would be very difficult to apply.41  
 The legal status of “personhood” would also arguably give the em-
bryo its own protected rights.42 This could possibly have the effect of 
outlawing,43 or at least rendering impractical,44 the work of most IVF 
clinics. For these reasons, no other jurisdiction has adopted the ap-
proach followed by the Louisiana Legislature and characterized em-
bryos as “persons.”45 
 The most accepted characterization of the frozen embryo is that of 
“property deserving special respect,” a characterization first an-
                                                                                                                      
 40. See §§ 9:123, :131; Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 21, 1989), rev’d, 1990 WL 130807, 59 USLW 2205 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), 
aff’d, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 41. With no child in existence, it would be difficult to assess the factors of the best in-
terest of the child test, which largely rely on looking at the relationship between the child 
and parents and the special needs of the child. See Woodhouse, supra note 35.  
 42. In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court concluded that “the unborn 
have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.” 410 U.S. 113, 162 
(1973); see Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 n.8 
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“No Member of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus 
is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 43. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595 (noting that vesting embryos with the status of person 
“would doubtless have . . . the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the state”).  
 44. This status could hamper the work of IVF clinics because it could require IVF clin-
ics to provide storage for the embryos indefinitely. Also, the IVF clinic could arguably be 
subject to lawsuits brought by the guardians of the embryos if the embryo is damaged, 
wrongfully implanted in another person, or disposed of by the clinic. See Miller v. Am. In-
fertility Group, No. 02L7394 (Cook County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2005) (on file with Cook 
County Court) (order ruling that progenitors had a wrongful death claim for the destruc-
tion of their embryos by an IVF clinic); Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 
(2003) (discussing the implications of a recent decision concerning wrongful implantation). 
 45. As of the publishing of this Article, no legislature has adopted a similar approach 
to that taken by the Louisiana Legislature. An Illinois court, however, recently followed 
similar reasoning in a wrongful death claim brought by progenitors against a clinic that 
destroyed their frozen embryos. See Miller v. Am. Infertility Group, No. 02L7394 (Cook 
County, Ill., Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2005) (on file with Cook County Court). 
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nounced by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis.46  The 
court in Davis examined the nature of a frozen embryo and, relying 
on the ethical standards established by The American Fertility Soci-
ety, espoused that an embryo’s unique capability of becoming human 
life upon implantation and gestation distinguished it from pure prop-
erty.47 By contrast, such potential is not recognized as being present 
in individual gamete cells, justifying separate treatment for frozen 
embryos.48  
 The “special respect” status is a unique hybrid characterization. 
Unlike the status of pure “property,” the status of “special respect” 
does not provide the progenitors a “true property interest.”49 Rather, 
it provides them “an interest in the nature of ownership, to the ex-
tent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition 
of the preembryos, within the scope of policy set by law.”50  Flowing 
from this characterization of the embryo are two concepts—
progenitors should be able to create contracts concerning the use or 
disposition of the embryo, and the creation of the embryo triggers the 
progenitors’ constitutional interests in procreation.51  
 The status of special respect is distinct from the status of person-
hood because it does not view the embryo as possessing unique inter-
ests itself.52 Moreover, if the embryo is not viewed as a person, courts 
resolving embryo disputes are not confined to engage in analytical 
endeavors generally found in family law disputes such as the best in-
terests of the child test.53  
 Unlike the designations of “property” and “person,” the charac-
terization of embryos as “property deserving special respect” does not 
provide a clear legal framework for the court. This characterization 
allows the courts to remove the dispute from the realm of property 
law54 while at the same time avoid legal presumptions of family and 
the best interest of the child test traditionally utilized in family 
court.55 However, beyond these distinguishing characteristics, it is 
                                                                                                                      
 46. 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 47. Id. at 596-97. 
 48. See id. (distinguishing statutes addressing the disposition of human organs from 
embryo disputes because human tissues and organs do not have the ability to develop into 
independent human life like an embryo); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text 
(discussing the legal status of gametes). 
 49. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 597-98.  
 52. Id. at 595. 
 53. See id. at 597. But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West, Westlaw through 2005 
Regular Sess. Acts) (classifying an in vitro fertilized human ovum as a jurisdictional per-
son). 
 54. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (explaining that the progenitors did not have a true 
property interest in the embryos). 
 55. Id. at 594-97. 
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unclear whether the designation of special respect status provides 
embryo disputes any special consideration. 
 While some courts have adopted one of the bright-line approaches 
to the determination of the status of the embryo, viewing it as either 
property or person, the majority of courts dealing with embryo dis-
putes have adopted the hybrid special respect status.56 The ambigu-
ous nature of this status has permitted courts to avoid addressing or 
defining the aspects of special respect due to the embryo. As a result, 
those courts recognizing the special respect status of embryos have 
actually treated the embryo more as property than as a person. 
 Treatment of the embryo more as property than as a person under 
the special respect designation is evident in the potential resolutions 
entertained by courts utilizing this view of the embryo. Courts using 
this approach entertain the possibility that the embryo should be 
discarded or used for research purposes.57 Such options likely are not 
possible if the embryo is viewed as having more characteristics of 
personhood rather than property, as personhood may provide the 
embryo with a right to be implanted and the opportunity to develop 
into a human being.58 Further, courts that adopt the special respect 
view of embryos affirm the concept that the progenitors can freely 
contract for sole control over the embryo.59 Parents of born children, 
however, cannot contract away rights to visitation or support of their 
children if such an agreement would not be in the best interest of the 
children, as these rights are considered vested in the children.60 Be-
cause such contracts are permitted in the context of embryo disputes, 
this suggests that the embryo is being viewed less as a potential life 
and more as property. Further, agreements between progenitors re-
garding the disposition of the embryo are not subjected to potential 
court oversight as is provided for when parents make agreements 
concerning custody, visitation and support pertaining to a born 
child.61 The reluctance of the court to intercede on behalf of the em-
bryo or conceive of court oversight for such arrangements supports 
the view of the embryo as property-like.  
                                                                                                                      
 56. Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to Cus-
tody of Frozen Embryo, Pre-Embryo, or Pre-Zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or Other Cir-
cumstances, 87 A.L.R. 5TH 253, 261-62 (2004). 
 57. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (explaining that the progenitors can agree to direct 
the disposition of their embryos in any manner consistent with the law). 
 58. See id. at 595-97; Robertson, supra note 4.  
 59. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. Under this view, progenitors have the ability to control  
the embryo like other forms of property.  
 60. White v. Laingor, 746 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Mass. 2001) (finding parents’ agreement to 
exchange parental rights for reduction in child support payments to be unenforceable, as 
there was no determination that the agreement was in the child’s best interests). 
 61. See, e.g.,  id.  
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 Some courts have argued that a determination of the status of the 
embryo is not necessary for resolution of the embryo dispute.62 Spe-
cifically, those courts employing a pure contract model have reasoned 
that a determination of the legal status of the embryo is unnecessary 
because the progenitors’ contract will be enforced regardless of the 
embryo’s legal status.63 As discussed above, however, the very recog-
nition of the progenitors’ authority to contract for the disposition of 
the embryo without court oversight implicitly emphasizes the prop-
erty-like nature of the embryo.64 Therefore, despite statements to the 
contrary, resolution of the embryo dispute under principles of con-
tract law necessitates a property-based view of the legal status of the 
embryo.  
B.   The Legal Role of the Progenitors in the Frozen Embryo Dispute 
 Another key aspect of embryo disputes is the recognized role and 
interest of the progenitors. To gain a full understanding of the im-
pact the litigation process has on the resolution of embryo disputes, 
an examination of the progenitors’ interests and of the nature of 
their authority over the embryo is imperative. Further, a considera-
tion of the relationship between the progenitors and their expecta-
tions from the IVF process is important to fully examine the effect of 
the adversarial process on the resolution of disputes between the 
progenitors. 
 Progenitors each contribute their genetic material towards the 
creation of the embryo.65 Because each progenitor has a genetic link 
to the embryo, each is recognized as having a stake in the outcome of 
the disposition of the embryo.66 At the point most embryo disputes 
enter litigation, the progenitors no longer agree whether and under 
what circumstances the embryo should be utilized or disposed. Often, 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-81 (N.Y. 1998). 
 63. In Kass, the court determined that it was not presented with this issue because 
such a determination was only relevant to resolve this issue of the constitutional rights of 
the parties and whether these rights dictated a particular result. Id. 
 64. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of gam-
etes as property and an analysis of such treatment for embryos. 
 65. Other parties who are not themselves progenitors may have a stake in an embryo 
dispute.  Typically, such individuals are recognized as parties to the dispute because they 
have acquired the use of another’s gametes through donation and have a contractual right 
to the genetic material that has been used to create the embryo. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 
P.3d 261, 267 (Wash. 2002) (“Petitioner did not produce the eggs used to create the preem-
bryos . . . [and] has no biological connection to the preembryos and is not a progenitor. Any 
right the petitioner may have to the preembryos must be based solely upon [the egg donor] 
contract.”).  While there are clear points of overlap in situations where a party at interest 
is not a true progenitor and the analysis presented in this Article could apply in those 
cases, the Article focuses on the disputes between two genetic progenitors. 
 66. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). The biological connection pro-
vides the basis for the recognition of decisionmaking authority over the embryo in each 
progenitor. Id. 
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their decisions are limited to allowing the embryo to be used by ei-
ther of them for implantation, permitting the embryo to be thawed 
and discarded, donating the embryo to another individual or couple, 
or possibly donating the embryo to research.67 
 One area in which courts resolving embryo disputes disagree is 
the nature of the interests of the progenitors. For some courts, the 
primary recognized interest is the progenitors’ interest in procrea-
tional autonomy.68 This interest is invoked in the embryo dispute be-
cause the decision regarding the disposition of the embryo is central 
to the choice to procreate.69 It is not clear, however, whether all 
courts agree as to the nature of this interest and the impact of the 
resolution of the embryo dispute on this interest. Further, while 
various commentators have recognized that the progenitors may 
have other significant interests in the embryo dispute, universally 
courts have confined their analysis to the interests of procreation and 
parenthood.70 Other interests that have been rejected as irrelevant to 
the resolution of an embryo dispute include a progenitor’s interest in 
the following: preserving what he or she may believe to be human 
life,71 ensuring that the resolution of the dispute reflects any unequal 
physical contributions made by a progenitor in the creation of the 
embryo,72 and rendering a resolution which is consistent with the 
best interest of any child that may result from the implantation of 
the embryo.73 
 Among those courts that view the primary interest involved in the 
embryo dispute as being the progenitors’ right to procreation, there is 
disagreement about whether this interest is better attributed to each 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Some of the progenitors’ choices may be limited because of regulation on use of 
stem cell research and human embryos. See Baum, supra note 24, at 130-40; Gitter, supra 
note 24, at 338-43. 
 68. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600-03. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357, 402 (1986) 
(arguing that women have a strong interest in determining the disposition of the embryo 
given their privacy rights in gestating children); Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or 
Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1066-69 (1996) (arguing that both 
progenitors have a significant interest in assuring that their individual physical contribu-
tions made in creating the embryo are considered in any determination regarding the dis-
position of the embryos); Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Comment, To Have or Not to Have: 
Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 
CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1399-1402 (1995) (concluding that the woman progenitor has a strong 
interest in the embryo given that she would gestate the embryos in the future, and there-
fore, her choice regarding the disposition of the embryos should prevail); Donna A. Katz, 
Note, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding Which Party Re-
ceives Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 667-74 (1998) (arguing 
that progenitors who have relied on an assurance that the embryos would be utilized and 
are now no longer able to conceive biological children have a significant interest in disposi-
tion decision). 
 71. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 711 (N.J. 2001). 
 72. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. 
 73. In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 774-75 (Iowa 2003). 
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progenitor individually or to the progenitors jointly. The contempo-
raneous mutual consent model purports to recognize this interest as 
an individual interest of each of the progenitors.74 According to pro-
ponents of this model, to permit either party to override the decision 
of the other would undermine each progenitor’s individual interest in 
procreation.75 In practice, however, this model supports the view of 
the right to procreation as a mutual endeavor by both progenitors.  
 Those who advocate for the contemporaneous mutual consent 
model argue that, to preserve the individual rights of each progeni-
tor, neither progenitor should be permitted to make a decision re-
garding the use of the embryo without the support and acquiesce of 
the other progenitor.76  However, by requiring any decision regarding 
the disposition of the embryo to be mutually agreed on by the pro-
genitors at the time the embryo is to be implanted or otherwise dis-
posed, the contemporaneous mutual consent model treats the right to 
procreation as a joint interest of the progenitors.  
 On the other end of the debate, some courts view and treat the in-
terest in procreation as an individual right vested in each progeni-
tor.77 For these courts and advocates, the decision to procreate is very 
closely linked to the individual progenitor’s identity.78 Under this in-
terpretation, the interest in procreation implicates issues such as 
personal autonomy.79 Therefore, for courts utilizing this understand-
ing of the progenitors’ interest in procreation, each progenitor’s 
choice is considered and examined separately.80 
 Another emerging trend of disagreement is with the point at 
which the interest in procreation is realized. For some courts, the 
recognized interest in procreation is an interest connected with the 
use of each progenitor’s gametes.81 Under this theory, the decision to 
procreate is made by each progenitor when he or she agrees to un-
dergo the IVF therapy and consents to the use of his or her genetic 
material to create the embryo.82 Therefore, for these courts, the pri-
mary focus in resolving an embryo dispute is the progenitor’s deci-
sion at the beginning of the IVF treatment—or at least the progeni-
tor’s decision at the time the embryo is created.83 Other courts dis-
agree with this characterization of the nature of the interest in pro-
                                                                                                                      
 74. Id. at 777; see Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: 
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 81 (1999). 
 75. Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 778; see Coleman, supra note 74, at 81-110. 
 76. Coleman, supra note 74, at 81-110. 
 77. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-59 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 
716-17 (N.J. 2001); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598-603. 
 78. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057-59; J.B., 783 A.2d at 716-17; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598-603. 
 79. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598-603.  
 80. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1057-59; J.B., 783 A.2d at 716-17; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598-603. 
 81. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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creation. These courts reason that the right to procreation is an ongo-
ing choice that is initially triggered when the progenitor agrees to 
utilize his or her genetic material to create the embryo and continues 
at least until the point the embryo is implanted with the intention 
that it become a child.84 This is an important distinction because it 
provides for different models of resolution and different views of the 
progenitor’s authority over the embryo. 
 For those courts that view the interest in procreation as being 
fully realized when the embryo is created and cryogenically pre-
served, the embryo dispute is resolved by upholding the intention of 
the progenitors as that intention was expressed when the embryo 
was created.85 This permits the progenitors’ true procreational choice 
to be executed by the court. By contrast, for those courts that view 
the interest in procreation as a continuing interest that is not fully 
realized until the embryo is implanted, embryo disputes are resolved 
by permitting the progenitors to make contemporaneous decisions 
about the disposition of the embryo.86 Under such an approach the 
progenitor is not bound by his or her previous choice to create the 
embryo. Rather, the progenitor is empowered to make a choice re-
garding procreation that is consistent with his or her current state of 
mind at the time that the embryo is to be implanted or otherwise dis-
posed.87  
 In addition to the recognized interests of the progenitors, the role 
the progenitors play in orchestrating the creation of the embryo also 
informs the embryo dispute resolution process. The embryo disputes 
that are at the center of this Article are between progenitors who 
each actively participated in the creation of the embryo through the 
donation of genetic material.88 As such, the progenitors usually are 
involved in some relationship during the IVF process.89 Unlike do-
nors who waive their rights to their gametes and any resulting em-
bryos generated in the IVF process,90 progenitors are typically in-
vested in the process to the extent that the progenitors still perceive 
                                                                                                                      
 84. In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777-79 (Iowa 2003). 
 85. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. 
 86. Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 777-79. 
 87. Id. at 782-83. 
 88. See supra note 65 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes a 
progenitor and the overlap in interests between progenitors and those who orchestrate the 
formation of the embryo. 
 89. In all cases discussed in depth in this Article, the couple was married during IVF 
treatments. Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 772; A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1052 (Mass. 
2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 709 (N.J. 2001); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175; Davis v. Davis, 
842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992). 
 90. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973) (“The donor of semen provided to a licensed phy-
sician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor’s wife is 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”). 
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a potential role in the bearing or rearing of any child that results 
from the IVF process.91 
 Because progenitors are typically involved in relationships during 
the IVF process, some scholars have suggested that any prior direc-
tives regarding eventual disposition of the embryos that were en-
tered into by the progenitors at the time of the IVF process should be 
highly suspect.92 Some have argued that because most progenitors 
are involved in relationships during IVF treatments, they may be 
subject to coercion and feel compelled to agree to an arrangement for 
disposition of the embryos that would not otherwise be agreed to by 
both.93 
 In addition to the potential for coercion, progenitors involved in 
relationships during IVF may also be induced to rely on the other 
progenitor’s assent to an eventual disposition for the embryos.94 Some 
progenitors choose to undergo IVF because they are facing a medical 
condition that may make them less likely to be able to have biological 
children in the future.95 In some instances, a progenitor has under-
gone IVF to create frozen embryos because the progenitor was going 
to have or already had part of his or her reproductive system re-
moved, rendering it impossible to create biological children in the fu-
ture.96 A later dispute regarding disposition of such embryos puts 
these progenitors in a situation in which they may lose the opportu-
nity to ever utilize the embryos to create biologically related children.  
 These situations, in which the progenitor has relied on a fellow 
progenitor’s agreement to create embryos to his or her detriment, 
have engendered academic debate over whether embryos in such 
situations should be awarded to the reliant progenitor under a theory 
similar to equitable estoppel.97 Under slightly different reasoning, 
the Davis court recognized that a progenitor who is no longer able to 
conceive biologically related children should be awarded the embryos 
if the progenitors disagree about their disposition.98 
 Under any approach, the possibility of coercion and the progeni-
tors’ expectations from participation in the IVF process might play a 
role in the legal strategies they use during resolution of the embryo 
dispute. Even if these issues do not directly affect the court’s deci-
                                                                                                                      
 91. Coleman, supra note 74, at 97-104. 
 92. Id. at 102-04; Judith F. Daar, Frozen Embryo Disputes Revisited: A Trilogy of Pro-
creation-Avoidance Approaches, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 201-02 (2001). 
 93. Coleman, supra note 74, at 102-04. 
 94. Id. at 102-04. 
 95. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998) (discussing the difficulty 
the progenitor had in conceiving based on “prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES)”). 
 96. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1052 (Mass. 2000) (noting that progenitor’s 
left fallopian tube was removed as a result of prior ectopic pregnancy). 
 97. Robertson, supra note 28, at 414-16; Katz, supra note 70, at 662-65. 
 98. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-05 (Tenn. 1992). 
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sionmaking process, these issues do suggest that the roles progeni-
tors play in the IVF process itself impact the progenitors’ expecta-
tions from the dispute resolution process. 
 Another aspect of the progenitors’ roles in the IVF process that is 
relevant to the dispute resolution process is the extent to which each 
progenitor has made contributions toward the creation of the embryo. 
While it is clear that each progenitor physically contributes genetic 
material toward the creation of the embryo, the level of physical 
commitment of each progenitor is not equal.99 The female progenitor 
typically undergoes months of hormone injections and a difficult and 
painful procedure in which eggs are harvested.100 By comparison, the 
female progenitor’s physical contribution is much more significant 
than the counterpart contribution of the male progenitor.101 The dis-
parity in physical labor has led some to advocate for a presumption 
in favor of the female progenitor’s preference in determining the dis-
position of frozen embryo disputes.102 While courts have universally 
rejected this approach, many recognize the disparity in physical la-
bor on the part of the progenitors.103  
III.   CURRENT JUDICIAL RESOLUTIONS OF FROZEN EMBRYO DISPUTES 
A.   Balancing Interests in Procreation 
 One predominant approach used by courts and scholars to resolve 
disputes over frozen embryos is the procreative rights model.104 Un-
der this paradigm, the court weighs the interests of both gamete pro-
viders and decides whether the individual seeking implantation or 
destruction of the embryo has the greater constitutionally protected 
interest.105  
 The first court to utilize this balancing test was the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis.106 In Davis, the progenitors, Mary 
Sue Davis and Junior Davis, pursued IVF procedures during the 
course of their marriage.107 The IVF treatments generated the crea-
tion of several embryos that were cryogenically preserved.108 Mary 
                                                                                                                      
 99. See generally Robertson, supra note 4, at 441-46 (reviewing the biological steps of 
early embryos and noting the “woman’s interest in her bodily integrity and other compet-
ing interests may take priority over concern for an early embryo and even more developed 
fetuses”). 
 100. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-02; Robertson, supra note 4, at 441-46. 
 101. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-02. 
 102. Andrews, supra note 70, at 403 (arguing that women have a strong interest in de-
termining the disposition of the embryo given their privacy rights in gestating children). 
 103. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601-02. 
 104. Id. at 603-04; see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719-20 (N.J. 2001). 
 105. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04. 
 106. 842 S.W.2d 588. 
 107. Id. at 591. 
 108. Id. at 592. 
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Sue and Junior, however, later divorced without using or otherwise 
disposing of all of their embryos.109 During the divorce proceedings, 
the issue arose as to which progenitor should be awarded “custody” of 
the embryos.110 Initially, Mary Sue sought to have control over the 
embryos as she intended to use them to become pregnant.111 Junior 
sought to leave the embryos cryogenically preserved so that he could 
“decide[] whether or not he wanted to become a parent outside the 
bounds of marriage.”112 By the time the dispute reached the Tennes-
see Supreme Court, both progenitors had remarried and had changed 
their minds as to what should be done with the embryos.113 Mary Sue 
no longer wanted to use the embryos herself.114 Instead, she sought to 
have the embryos donated to another childless couple.115 Junior op-
posed donation and sought to have the embryos discarded as he did 
not want to permit a biologically related child to be raised in a single-
parent home and he could not guarantee that any couple receiving 
the embryos through donation would remain married.116 
 In attempting to resolve this dispute, the Davis court explained 
that disputes between progenitors over the control of frozen embryos 
should be resolved according to the express written prior directives of 
the progenitors.117 Mary Sue and Junior, however, had not entered 
into any express prior directives when they underwent IVF treat-
ments.118 Therefore, the Davis court determined that the issue of who 
should be awarded control of the embryos would be best resolved by 
an examination of the Davises’ constitutional rights to privacy.119 
                                                                                                                      
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 589. The Davis court described the dispute as one over custody, a term 
characteristic of disputes over live children. While the court relied on this term, it did not 
use the best interest of the child test typically utilized in custody disputes because it found 
that embryos are deserving of special status and are not persons. Id. at 589-90. 
 111. Id. at 589. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 590. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  
Junior Davis is vehemently opposed to fathering a child that would not live 
with both parents. Regardless of whether he or Mary Sue had custody, he feels 
that the child’s bond with the non-custodial parent would not be satisfactory. 
He testified very clearly that his concern was for the psychological obstacles a 
child in such a situation would face, as well as the burdens it would impose on 
him. Likewise, he is opposed to donation because the recipient couple might di-
vorce, leaving the child (which he definitely would consider his own) in a sin-
gle-parent setting.  
Id. at 604. 
 117. Id. at 597 (“We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding disposi-
tion of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death of 
one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) 
should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors.”). 
 118. Id. at 598. 
 119. Id. at 598-603. 
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 In examining the constitutional rights of progenitors who have 
created embryos through IVF procedures, the Davis court acknowl-
edged that the “individual freedom in dispute is the right to procre-
ate” and that “the right of procreation is a vital part of an individ-
ual’s [constitutional] right to privacy.”120 The Davis court recognized 
that central to the right to procreation are “two rights of equal sig-
nificance—the right to procreate and the right to avoid procrea-
tion.”121  
 In deciding how to balance these equal yet opposing interests, the 
Davis court examined the “positions of the [progenitors], the signifi-
cance of their interests, and the relative burdens that [would] be im-
posed by differing resolutions.”122  A significant burden recognized by 
the Davis court as being intertwined with the interest of procreation 
or avoiding procreation is the interest in becoming a parent or in 
avoiding “unwanted parenthood.”123 Awarding decisional authority 
over the embryos to Junior, the Davis court concluded that the bur-
den of unwanted parenthood was more significant than Mary Sue’s 
interest in wanting to donate the embryos to another couple.124 The 
Davis court explained that if the embryos were donated to another 
couple, Junior “would face a lifetime of either wondering about his 
parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no 
control over it.”125 As a result, if a child resulted from the donation, 
Junior would be twice robbed—“his procreational autonomy would be 
defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohib-
ited.”126 In comparison, the Davis court viewed Mary Sue’s burden as 
less significant because she was not attempting to use the embryo to 
achieve parenthood for herself. Further, she would be able to 
“achieve parenthood in all its aspects—genetic, gestational, bearing, 
and rearing” through future IVF procedures.127  
 While the procreational rights test was posed by the Davis court 
as a “balancing” test wherein both gamete providers possess equal 
interests to “custody” of the embryo, no court using this test has ever 
awarded decisional authority over the embryos to the gamete pro-
vider who is interested in allowing the embryos to be implanted.128 
Typically courts reason that the interests in not becoming a parent, 
even only biologically, outweigh any interest in becoming a parent 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Id. at 600. 
 121. Id. at 601. 
 122. Id. at 603. 
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 128. Id.; see J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 783 (N.J. 2001); Daar, supra note 92. 
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through the implantation of the embryos.129 The only recognized ex-
ception to this outcome is if the gamete provider who is interested in 
allowing the embryos to be implanted wishes to use the embryos 
himself or herself and is unable to become a parent through any 
other means, possibly even including adoption.130 Under these limited 
circumstances, the courts have recognized that the interest of the 
progenitor wishing to use the embryos to achieve parenthood may 
outweigh the interests of the progenitor seeking to avoid their use for 
implantation.131 
 Utilizing a similar approach, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
J.B. v. M.B.132 awarded disputed frozen embryos to the progenitor 
seeking to have them discarded.133 J.B. and M.B. underwent IVF 
treatment during their marriage.134 As a result of the IVF treatment 
process, the couple created several embryos that were cryogenically 
preserved.135 From these embryos, J.B. was able to achieve pregnancy 
and give birth to the couple’s daughter.136 Shortly after the birth of 
their daughter, J.B. and M.B. decided to divorce.137 J.B. sought a 
court award permitting the embryos to be discarded.138 Conversely, 
M.B. sought to have the embryos remain in storage to be used for 
later implantation or donation to another infertile couple.139 
 Noting that J.B. and M.B. failed to enter into a “formal, unambi-
guous memorialization of [their] intentions” at the time they under-
went the IVF procedures,140 the J.B. court concluded that the appro-
priate analysis for resolution of their claims to the embryos would be 
to balance their respective procreational rights.141 Unlike the court in 
                                                                                                                      
 129. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04. 
 130. See Jennifer L. Medenwald, Note, A “Frozen Exception” for the Frozen Embryo: 
The Davis “Reasonable Alternatives Exception,” 76 IND. L.J. 507 (2001) (discussing applica-
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Davis, however, the court in J.B. determined that the conflict be-
tween the progenitors’ interests in procreation and in avoiding pro-
creation were “more apparent than real.”142 The J.B. court explained 
that M.B.’s right to procreate was not lost if the embryos were de-
stroyed because he was “already a father and [was] able to become a 
father to additional children, whether through natural procreation or 
further in vitro fertilization.”143 According to the J.B. court, J.B.’s in-
terest in avoiding procreation would “be lost through attempted use 
or through donation of the preembryos” because “[i]mplantation, if 
successful, would result in the birth of her biological child and could 
have life-long emotional and psychological repercussions.”144 
B.   Parenthood by Contract 
 Another approach to resolving embryo disputes that is advocated 
by courts and scholars is the contractual theory approach. This ap-
proach has two predominant variations—the prior directives ap-
proach145 and the contemporaneous mutual consent approach.146 Un-
der either of these variations, the focus for the court is the intention 
of the parties as to the disposition of any embryos that should remain 
after a triggering event such as the death of a progenitor or the sepa-
ration or divorce of the progenitors. 
1.   Enforcement of Prior Directives 
 The first variation to be recognized by the courts on the contrac-
tual theory was the enforcement of prior directives approach.147 To 
understand this contractual theory, it is important to first under-
stand how such contracts are formed. While the majority of progeni-
tors do not enter into agreements regarding the disposition of any 
embryos created during IVF treatment should they later no longer 
wish to continue jointly in treatment,148 most progenitors sign in-
formed consent forms prior to undergoing treatment in the IVF proc-
ess.149 On most informed consent forms, the progenitors are asked to 
indicate what they intend to do with any embryos that remain in a 
                                                                                                                      
 142. Id. at 716. 
 143. Id. at 717. 
 144. Id. The J.B. court explained, “[J.B.’s] fundamental right not to procreate is irrevo-
cably extinguished if a surrogate mother bears J.B.’s child. We will not force J.B. to become 
a biological parent against her will.” Id. 
 145. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 
2002). See generally Shapo, supra note 20; Waldman, supra note 27. 
 146. In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). See generally Coleman, 
supra note 74. 
 147. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174; Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 261.  
 148. See Waldman, supra note 27, at 918 (noting that most courts and scholars promot-
ing a contract-based approach to resolving embryo disputes are forced to treat informal 
consent forms as contracts between the progenitors). 
 149. See also id. at 918-33; Daar, supra note 92, at 201-02. 
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cryogenic state on the happening of a trigger event. Several trigger 
events include the following: death of a progenitor, divorce, separa-
tion, incapacitation of a progenitor or any other event which renders 
either of the progenitors unable to jointly determine the disposition of 
the embryos.150 These consent forms, while an agreement between 
the progenitors and the IVF clinic, have been utilized by courts as 
express prior directives of the progenitors as to their respective rights 
against each other.151 
 The first court to adopt this approach to resolve an embryo dis-
pute was the Court of Appeals of New York in Kass v. Kass.152 Like 
the progenitors in Davis and J.B., Maureen and Steven Kass under-
went IVF treatments during their marriage with the intention of 
creating embryos to be used by them to achieve parenthood.153 After 
several embryos were created and preserved cryogenically, they di-
vorced.154 During the divorce proceedings, Maureen Kass sought an 
order to obtain control over the embryos to use them to achieve par-
enthood.155 At the time of the dispute, the only way by which Mau-
reen could achieve genetic motherhood would be through the use of 
the embryos.156 Steven Kass opposed Maureen’s action, arguing that 
the embryos should be donated to the IVF program for approved re-
search purposes.157 
 The Kass court reasoned that the best analytical framework to re-
solve embryo disputes between progenitors would be the one that in-
volved the least interference by the court.158 Therefore, the Kass court 
explained that the intention of the progenitors, as is evidenced in 
their prior directives, should be the directive to the court.159 Accord-
ingly, the Kass court concluded that progenitors’ prior agreements 
regarding the disposition of embryos are “presumed valid and bind-
ing, and [are to be] enforced in any dispute between” the progeni-
tors.160 
 The Kass court explained that the use of prior directives avoided 
the lack of clarity and predictability created by the procreative rights 
model and simplified what would otherwise be protracted litigation 
                                                                                                                      
 150. See Coleman, supra note 74, at 109-17 (discussing possible options for disposition 
of an embryo). 
 151. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 268-69. 
 152. 696 N.E.2d 174. 
 153. Id. at 175. 
 154. Id. at 177. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 175-77. 
 157. Id. at 177. 
 158. Id. at 180. The Kass court noted that “[t]o the extent possible, it should be the 
progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior directive make this 
deeply personal life choice.” Id. 
 159. Id. at 180-81. 
 160. Id. at 180. 
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in a very private and highly emotional aspect of the progenitors’ 
lives.161 In addition, the Kass court opined that advance directives 
“maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the au-
thority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially per-
sonal, private decision.”162 The Kass court, however, also recognized 
shortcomings of its contractual rights model. Placing such weight on 
prior directives, like those contained in informed consent forms, 
might lead to enforcement of agreements made without much 
thought to the future.163 The “uncertainties inherent in the IVF proc-
ess itself are vastly complicated by cryopreservation, which extends 
the viability of pre-zygotes indefinitely and allows time for minds, 
and circumstances, to change.”164 The Kass court, however, explained 
that it is for this reason that prior directives should be enforced.165 
Otherwise, “[a]dvance agreements as to disposition would have little 
purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the parties contin-
ued to agree.”166 
 In an attempt to determine the Kasses’ intention, the Kass court 
reviewed the informed consent forms Maureen and Steven Kass 
signed while undergoing various phases of the IVF process.167 Despite 
Maureen’s objections, the Kass court concluded that the informed 
consent forms “unequivocally manifest[ed] [the Kasses’] mutual in-
tention that in the present circumstances [of their divorce] the pre-
zygotes be donated for research to the IVF program.”168 
 Following a similar rationale but with more unusual results, the 
Supreme Court of Washington, in an en banc decision, enforced a 
prior directive against the contemporaneous objection of both parties 
entitled to claim “custody” of the embryos.169 In Litowitz v. Litowitz, 
Becky and David Litowitz brought an action to resolve issues of cus-
tody over embryos created during their marriage.170 By the time of 
the action, the Litowitzes successfully achieved pregnancy through 
the use of embryos created during their marriage from David’s ge-
netic material and genetic material from an egg donor.171 They, how-
ever, separated prior to the birth of their daughter and eventually 
                                                                                                                      
 161. Id. The Kass court explained that prior advance directives “are all the more neces-
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any litigation are simply incalculable.” Id. 
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 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 180-81. 
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 169. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
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filed for divorce.172 During the dissolution proceedings, Becky peti-
tioned the court to permit her to utilize the embryos for implantation 
in a surrogate mother.173 David opposed Becky’s use of the embryos 
but did not wish the embryos to be discarded. Rather, he sought to 
have the embryos donated to a childless couple.174 
 Relying on Kass, the Litowitz court determined that the dispute 
should be resolved in a manner consistent with the contractual rights 
of the parties.175 Examining the cyropreservation contract entered 
into by Becky and David at the time of the IVF treatments, the Li-
towitz court concluded that the Litowitzes had agreed that their em-
bryos “ ‘be thawed but not allowed to undergo further development.’ ”176 
The court also found that the contract provided for cryopreservation 
of the embryos for five years, at the end of which the embryos “‘would 
be thawed but not allowed to undergo any further development’ 
unless the Litowitzes requested participation for an additional period 
of time and the Center agreed.”177 Because more than five years had 
passed and neither party had requested an extension of the contract, 
the Litowitz court concluded that the IVF clinic was directed by the 
Litowitzes, under the cryopreservation contract, to discard the em-
bryos.178  
 While the Litowitz court relied on the contract theory analysis es-
poused in Kass, the Litowitz decision is very different from that of 
Kass. Unlike the court in Kass, the Litowitz court upheld the contract 
in the face of the objections from both individuals who had a right to 
claim an interest to the embryos.179 While both decisions focus on the 
need to uncover and enforce the intention of the progenitors at the 
time of the IVF treatment, the Litowitz court did so without regard to 
the fact that both of the individuals who had orchestrated the crea-
tion of the embryos180 had changed their position with respect to the 
appropriate use of the embryos.181 Such an approach fails to recognize 
change in intention by both parties and seems contrary to the princi-
                                                                                                                      
 172. Id. at 264. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 267. The Litowitz court concluded, while Becky was not herself a progenitor, 
under the egg donor contract she and David had equal rights to the eggs. Id. at 268. The 
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ple recognized in Kass that “[t]o the extent possible, it should be the 
progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior di-
rective make this deeply personal life choice.”182 
2.   Challenges to the Enforcement of Prior Directives 
 After the Kass decision, several courts criticized the contract the-
ory approach as a means for resolving embryo disputes. In A.Z. v. 
B.Z., the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rejected the enforcement 
of a prior directive.183 Examining informed consent forms signed by 
the progenitors upon their commencement of IVF treatments, the 
A.Z. court concluded that the forms did not represent the clear inten-
tion of the parties as to the proper disposition of their embryos 
should a dispute later arise between them.184  
 Despite finding that there was no written agreement that clearly 
expressed the intention of the progenitors, the A.Z. court critically 
examined the question of whether prior directives should ever be en-
forced by courts in embryo disputes.185 It concluded that “even had 
the [progenitors] entered into an unambiguous agreement between 
themselves regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, [it] 
would not enforce an agreement that would” have permitted the use 
of a frozen embryo for implantation by one progenitor over the objec-
tion of the other.186 The A.Z. court explained that such an agreement 
“would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her 
will.”187 Because “forced procreation is not an area amendable to judi-
cial enforcement,” the A.Z. court concluded that enforcement of prior 
directives would violate public policy.188 To support its conclusion, the 
court cited other contracts pertaining to familial relationships that 
are unenforceable as against public policy, including promises to 
marry and promises to surrender children for adoption prior to 
birth.189  
 While the J.B. court eventually applied the procreative rights bal-
ancing test to resolve the embryo dispute before it, the J.B. court also 
rejected the contract rights approach for reasons similar to those 
provided by the court in A.Z.190 While acknowledging the clarity and 
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predictability that enforcement of prior directives provides, the J.B. 
court determined that such agreements should not be enforced if a 
progenitor has changed his or her mind.191 The court explained 
“agreements [that] compel procreation over the subsequent objection 
of one of the parties . . . are violative of public policy.”192 “[B]y permit-
ting either party to object at a later date to provisions specifying a 
disposition of preembryos that that party no longer accepts,” the J.B. 
court concluded that “public policy concerns that underlie limitations 
on contracts involving family relationships are protected.”193  
3.   Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach 
 The most recent approach to the resolution of embryo disputes has 
arisen out of some of the criticisms to the contract theory approach. 
Adopted by the Supreme Court of Iowa in In re Marriage of Witten 
III, the contemporaneous mutual consent model is premised on the 
assumption that the court should resolve embryo disputes in a man-
ner consistent with the mutual will of the progenitors.194 
 The contemporaneous mutual consent model, similar to the con-
tract theory approach, is based on the concept that the progenitors 
have an equal right to control the disposition of the embryo.195 It is 
distinct from the contractual rights approach, however, in that the 
court does not resolve the embryo dispute in accordance with the par-
ties’ prior directives.196 Rather, the court focuses on the progenitors’ 
current intention with respect to the disposition of the embryos.197 
The Witten court explained that this shift in focus is necessary be-
cause individuals involved in IVF treatments are more likely to make 
decisions based on “feeling and instinct [rather] than rational delib-
eration”198 and the “erroneous prediction of how [one] will feel about 
the matter at some point in the future can have grave repercus-
sions.”199  
 Advocates of this model explain that decisions regarding the dis-
position of embryos can impact personal identity.200 For example, be-
cause parenthood is “an important act of self-definition,” permitting 
use of the embryo over a progenitor’s objection “imposes an unwanted 
identity on the individual, forcing her to redefine herself, her place in 
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the world, and the legacy she will leave after she dies.”201 Permitting 
an embryo to be discarded over the objection of a progenitor “can 
have equally profound consequences,” such as “life-altering feelings 
of mourning, guilt, and regret.”202 Those who support this model ad-
vocate that such results can be avoided while still maintaining re-
spect for the authority of the progenitors by preserving the status 
quo until the parties can reach a mutual agreement as to the disposi-
tion of the embryo.203 
 The Witten court adopted such an approach.204 Refusing to enforce 
the progenitors’ prior agreements and rejecting a procreative rights 
balancing test, the Witten court concluded that in “a situation in 
which one party no longer concurs in the parties’ prior agreement 
with respect to the disposition of their frozen embryos, but the par-
ties have been unable to reach a new agreement that is mutually sat-
isfactory,” the court will not resolve the dispute.205 Until the parties 
are able to reach a consensus, the Witten court directed that the 
party opposing destruction of the embryo was responsible for fees 
necessary to maintain the embryos in a cryogenic state.206 
IV.   DEFINITIONS OF PARENTHOOD AND PROCREATION IN FROZEN 
EMBRYO DISPUTES 
 Like in most family law contexts, the resolution of embryo dis-
putes necessitates the utilization of assumptions regarding parent-
hood and familial relationships. Traditional legal presumptions of 
family and parenthood, however, are not readily applicable in the 
context of frozen embryo disputes because the potential child will not 
be realized unless and until the embryo is implanted.207 As a result, 
new legal presumptions regarding familial associations are being de-
veloped within the context of frozen embryo disputes. This Part will 
examine the courts’ reliance on assumptions of parenthood and pro-
creation to support the promotion of one gamete provider’s interest 
over another. Further, this Part will critique the assumptions of par-
enthood and procreation relied upon in the resolution of frozen em-
bryo disputes, challenging the utility and accuracy of such assump-
tions. 
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A.   The Role of Biology in Parenthood and the Right to Procreation 
 In decisions resolving embryo disputes, a primary underlying as-
sumption involves a question about the nature of parenthood. The 
current tests utilized by courts in conflicts over embryos rely on the 
assumption that the most fundamental aspect of parenthood is a bio-
logical connection between the parent and the child.208 This assump-
tion is most visibly present in the procreative rights approach.  
 Under the procreative rights model, the court weighs the interests 
of the progenitors in procreation209 and awards the embryo to the 
progenitor whose interests will be most affected by a decision regard-
ing the use of the embryo.210 Every court that has applied this test 
has found that balance to favor the progenitor wishing to avoid pro-
creation. To justify tipping the balance in this manner, courts have 
reasoned that the implantation will force the progenitor into parent-
hood because he will feel a connection to the resulting child solely be-
cause of his biological connection to the child.211 The Davis court ex-
plained that the biological connection creates such a compelling 
sense of parenthood that, even assuming all other parental responsi-
bilities could be terminated, the progenitor wishing to avoid procrea-
tion would still bear the burden of forced parenthood because he 
would have the knowledge that his biologically related children ex-
ist.212  
 The supremacy of the biological connection in defining the nature 
of parenthood is also cognizable in the exception created under the 
procreative rights model.213 While the procreative rights model con-
siders the balance of interests to tip in favor of the progenitor seek-
ing to avoid use of the embryo, the balance will tip in favor of the 
progenitor seeking to use the embryo in a narrow set of circum-
stances.214 Known as the Davis exception, the balance of interests 
will tip in favor of the progenitor who intends to use the embryo him-
self or herself if the use of the embryo is the only way in which the 
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progenitor will be able to achieve biological parenthood.215 The recog-
nition of the dominance of the progenitor’s interest in seeking to use 
the embryo, however, occurs only when the progenitor is unable to 
achieve biological children through any means other than through 
the use of the embryo; it does not apply when the progenitor wishing 
to use the embryo intends to donate it to another couple.216  
 While the procreative rights model gives primary consideration to 
the role the biological connection plays in defining the concept of par-
enthood, the inconsistent and incomplete results yielded under this 
model, which are created by the courts’ reliance on biology, expose 
the flaws with such an assumption. First, under the traditional bal-
ance, the biological connection is considered the genesis of all other 
aspects of parenthood.217 While the courts rely on this principle to 
award the embryo to the individual seeking to avoid implantation, 
the contrary result also seems to be justified by the same principle. 
The progenitor wishing to implant the embryo for his or her own use 
will also feel the same compelling sense of parenthood should the 
embryo be used to create a child. Therefore, the biological connection 
does not seem to assist in the overall decision as to which progenitor 
to award the embryo. Second, the reliance on biology is undermined 
by the fact that not all progenitors wishing to permit the embryo to 
be implanted intend to participate in a parent-child relationship with 
any resulting child. For example, the Davis exception was not ap-
plied in the Davis case, as the progenitor favoring use of the embryos 
for implantation wanted to donate the embryos to a childless couple 
and did not intend to have a parent-child relationship with any child 
that was born from the embryo.218 This suggests that the courts’ reli-
ance on the per se connection between biological relationship and 
parenthood is not as compelling as the courts posit.219 
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 Further, the reliance on biology as the underpinning of parent-
hood is belied by other areas of family law. The presumption applied 
in the context of frozen embryo disputes—that the parent-child bond 
is primarily biological—clearly contradicts the presumption applied 
in the context of child custody disputes—that the parent-child bond 
matures and develops into a relationship that is more than a purely 
biological connection. In contested custody disputes, courts examine 
the strength of the parent-child relationship in assessing which par-
ent to award primary custody of the child.220 The court never pre-
sumes that a parent-child relationship exists based on a mere bio-
logical relationship with the child but rather examines the closeness 
of the connection between the parent and child.221 Additionally, the 
necessity of child support enforcement mechanisms undermines the 
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disputes. 
 221. One prevalent theme in family law is the recognition of the role and importance of 
bonding in the development of the parent-child relationship. Hurwitz, supra note 219, at 
158-67. Scientific studies have long supported the importance of a close, or bonded, rela-
tionship between a parent and child in the healthy development of children. Id. at 166. 
Some scientific research even suggests that parent-child bonding can exist between a 
pregnant mother and her gestating fetus. Id. at 159-60. Courts, relying on scientific and 
social research, often examine the “closeness” of the bond between a parent and child when 
making child custody and visitations determinations.  
 While scientific studies may recognize a parent-child bond in prebirth interaction be-
tween an expectant mother and her fetus, the parent-child bond recognized in family law 
contexts is typically limited to a recognition that the parent-child bond is not created solely 
out of a biological connection, but rather is developed and intensified with time and inter-
action. Id. at 158-67. This is evident through the best interest of the child test employed by 
courts in custody disputes. Under the best interest of the child test, the court examines 
several factors to determine which parent to award custody. Id. at 169-74 (discussing the 
application of the best interest of the child test in IVF cases). One factor in this test is the 
strength of the parent-child bond.  Id. at 172-74. The court examines the relationship be-
tween the child and each parent to determine whether the child has a close, bonded rela-
tionship with each and whether a stronger bond exists with one. Id. The fact that the court 
examines the child’s relationship with each parent under the best interest of the child test 
suggests that the parent-child bond is not primarily biological. Id. While each parent is bio-
logically related to the child, the court does not presume that a parent-child bond exists 
nor is particularly strong. Id. Rather, the court examines each parent-child relationship 
with an expectation that one relationship likely is more developed than the other.  Id. 
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presumption that a biological connection with a child will necessarily 
engender feelings of parental connection to a child.222 While an indi-
vidual gamete provider may oppose implantation of an embryo out of 
a concern that he or she will recognize a parental connection with the 
child simply because of a biological connection, the divergent treat-
ment of biology in these other areas of family law undermines the 
strong reliance on biology in embryo disputes. 
 The adversarial model exacerbates the courts’ over-reliance on the 
primacy of biology in defining parenthood. Under the procreational 
rights model, the court must decide which of the progenitors has the 
stronger interest in the embryo.223 Therefore, the court must attempt 
to identify and define the nature of the right to procreation. The right 
to procreation, however, has never been clearly defined by the United 
States Supreme Court.224 It has been viewed by most courts as hav-
ing several potential component parts: the right to bear children,225 
the right to raise children,226 and the right to companionship with 
one’s children.227 Aspects of parenthood that extend beyond the ge-
netic connection between the parent and the child, however, are very 
difficult to assess when the child has yet to be born or even gestated. 
Therefore, most courts faced with the difficult task of trying to weigh 
an individual progenitor’s interests in his or her cryogenically pre-
served embryos focus on one aspect of procreation that is most read-
ily observable and definable—the genetic connection between the 
progenitor and the embryo.  
 To avoid the necessity of reliance on biology, embryo disputes 
should be resolved under an alternative model of dispute resolution 
that does not require the balancing of the progenitors’ procreational 
interests. Under an alternative dispute resolution model, the pro-
genitors will be able to address their true interests in the embryo and 
decide whether they believe they possess feelings of compelled par-
enthood that courts currently reason exists with a biological connec-
tion. Moreover, an alternative dispute resolution model will permit 
the parties to consider other interests they may possess in the resolu-
tion of their embryo dispute which are not readily connected with 
their interest in procreation. 
                                                                                                                      
 222. See generally Erika M. Hiester, Note, Child Support Statutes and the Father’s 
Right Not to Procreate, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213 (2004). 
 223. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04. 
 224. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology 
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 366-69 (1991) (discussing the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the right of procreation). 
 225. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977). 
 226. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000). 
 227. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”); see also Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).  
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B.   The Role of Intention in Parenthood and Procreational Autonomy 
 Unlike the procreational rights balancing test which focuses on 
the constitutional interests of the progenitors, the contract theory 
approach focuses on the intention of the progenitors to resolve the 
embryo dispute.228 For courts utilizing the contract theory approach 
and the contemporaneous mutual consent model, the embryo dispute 
primarily raises issues of personal autonomy and self-identity.229 
Specifically, the decision to utilize the embryo is viewed as a choice to 
pursue parenthood or identify oneself as a parent.230 Because, under 
this model, the embryo dispute is laden with choices of autonomy and 
self-identity, the progenitors’ intended use or disposition of the em-
bryo forms the basis for the court’s resolution.231 
 For the contract theory approach, the challenge to personal 
autonomy arises when the court injects its judgment into the embryo 
dispute by denying enforcement of the prior directives.232 The charac-
terization of the decision to utilize or dispose of the embryo as one 
implicating personal autonomy or self-identity does not, however, 
sufficiently account for the true nature of the decision. While the de-
cision to direct the use of one’s own gametes is an independent choice 
clearly linked to personal autonomy, decisions regarding embryos are 
not so clearly linked to such an interest.233 The embryo, unlike gam-
etes, is the combined genetic creation of two individuals.234 Each in-
dividual’s sense of personal autonomy is linked to his or her own ge-
netic, gametic contribution.235 The embryo, however, is an entity 
separate from the person of each progenitor.236 It is not an extension 
or a part of the person of the progenitor. Because the embryo is not 
associated with the person of either progenitor, the connection be-
tween personal autonomy—a theory resting on the ability of the in-
dividual to control his or her own person—and the decision regarding 
disposition of the embryo is not as strong as the contract theory sug-
gests.237  
                                                                                                                      
 228. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-81 (N.Y. 1998). 
 229. In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780-82 (Iowa 2003); Kass, 696 
N.E.2d at 180. 
 230. See Coleman, supra note 74, at 114-19. 
 231. Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 780-82; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (“To the extent possible, 
it should be progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior directive 
make this deeply personal life choice.”). 
 232. See Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 780-82; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. 
 233. Hurwitz, supra note 219, at 153-54 (discussing the distinction between claims of 
ownership over gametes and claims of ownership over embryos). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. See generally Robertson, supra note 4, at 457-60. 
 236. Hurwitz, supra note 219, at 153-54.  
 237. Id. at 153-56. I do not intend to suggest that there are no contexts in which no-
tions of privacy and personal autonomy can be raised when an embryo has been created. In 
the context of abortion, the gestating mother has a recognized privacy interest which will 
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 The contemporaneous mutual consent model adds an additional 
complexity into the personal autonomy analysis, creating more ten-
sion for this justification. The contemporaneous mutual consent ap-
proach shares disdain for the court’s interference in the embryo dis-
pute.238 In addition to the challenge to personal autonomy by the 
court, the contemporaneous mutual consent model views the progeni-
tors, acting through the prior directive, as limiting each other’s per-
sonal autonomy.239 Under this model, the prior directive gives a pro-
genitor ultimate “veto” power over the other progenitor should he or 
she change his or her mind when the time for the disposition event 
arises.240 Because this model is premised on the idea that both pro-
genitors should maintain control over the embryo until the time of 
the disposition, the use of the prior directive by one progenitor to 
bind the other to a prior decision is considered a challenge to the per-
sonal autonomy of the progenitor who no longer concedes to the origi-
nal decision.241 
 This additional premise for the use of personal autonomy is prob-
lematic. The contemporaneous mutual consent model’s attempt at 
eliminating another’s ability to veto a decision appears to be consis-
tent with traditional notions of personal autonomy. Specifically, one 
should be able to make decisions about one’s person without chal-
lenge from another.242 However, the proffered resolution of this veto 
power itself links the decisions of the progenitors together. To resolve 
the embryo dispute, the contemporaneous mutual consent model re-
quires both parties to come to an agreed upon resolution for the em-
bryo before the court will be empowered to act.243 Therefore, the indi-
vidual’s decision is once again linked to the decision of another, un-
dermining reliance on notions of personal autonomy as a justification 
for the use of the parties’ intention to resolve embryo disputes. 
 The contract theory and contemporaneous mutual consent ap-
proaches also rest on the principle that the decision regarding dispo-
sition of the embryo triggers notions of self-identity.244 Namely, these 
approaches presume that the decision to utilize the embryo permits 
                                                                                                                      
permit her to abort an embryo or fetus. This interest, however, is triggered because of the 
gestating mother’s interest in her own body and not her interest in the gestating embryo or 
fetus. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 n.20 (Tenn. 1992) (distinguishing a couple’s 
agreement regarding an abortion from a couple’s agreement regarding the disposition of 
preembryos). 
 238. See In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003). 
 239. See id. at 782-83. 
 240. See id.  
 241. See id.; Coleman, supra note 74, at 95-98. 
 242. Coleman, supra note 74, at 95-98. 
 243. Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 782-83. 
 244. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); see also Coleman, supra note 74, at 
95-98. 
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the progenitor to attempt to define himself or herself as a parent.245 
The characterization of the embryo dispute as principally based upon 
the progenitors’ ability to control their self-identity is similarly 
flawed.  
 Self-identity is the ability of the individual to define himself or 
herself. In the embryo dispute, however, the progenitor is not rede-
fining his personal identity. Rather, he is attempting to redefine his 
identity in relation to another—that is, through a parent-child rela-
tionship.246 Because the relationship needs to be completed to create 
this new identity, the issue is less that of self-identity and more that 
of relational identity.247  
 Recognizing this as a relational concept raises the issue of 
whether intention should drive the resolution of the embryo dispute. 
Under a purely self-identity rationale, the intention of the individual 
to define himself would logically form the basis of the court’s focus.248  
Because the progenitor is attempting to define himself in a way 
which cannot occur through his will alone because this definition re-
quires the existence of a legally recognized parent-child relationship, 
arguably the focus should not rest solely on his intention.  
 Further, because the way that the progenitor is attempting to de-
fine himself requires a parent-child relationship, the court should 
consider the extent to which intention actually plays a part in creat-
ing this relationship.249 Recent disputes regarding custody of children 
born through collaborative IVF therapy250 have caused courts to look 
more closely at the role of intention in creating a legally recognizable 
parent-child relationship.251 Historically, intention has not played a 
primary role in determining parentage.252 In fact, legal responsibili-
ties to offspring have been historically enforced despite lack of inten-
tion to assume a parent-child relationship.253 While it may ultimately 
                                                                                                                      
 245. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Coleman, supra note 74, at 95-98; see also Hurwitz, 
supra note 219, at 140-49 (discussing the role of intention in determining parenthood in 
cases of collaborative reproduction). 
 246. Hurwitz, supra note 219, at 140-49. 
 247. Id.; see Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationship and Reproductive Technol-
ogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1116-21 (1998) (reasoning that the right to privacy, in the context 
of artificial reproduction, should be considered a relational rather than individual right). 
 248. See generally Hurwitz, supra note 219. 
 249. See id. at 146-49; see also Hill, supra note 224, at 413-18. 
 250. Collaborative IVF therapy involves more than two individuals. It may involve the 
use of genetic material from donors such as an egg donor or sperm donor or the use of a 
surrogate. 
 251. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (examin-
ing the effect parental intent had in creating legislative default rules). 
 252. Hurwitz, supra note 219, at 142. 
 253. Id. (“Many people who become parents unintentionally assume the rights and re-
sponsibilities of legal parenthood either voluntarily or by court order.”). See generally Heis-
ter, supra note 222 (discussing enforcement of mandatory child support provisions where 
children are born out of coital reproduction). 
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be determined that the contract theory model’s primary reliance on 
intention does provide the best analysis for resolution of embryo dis-
putes, the justification for the use of intention should be further ex-
amined.  
 While it is clear that courts resolving embryo disputes under the 
contract theory model prioritize the progenitors’ decision regarding 
the use of the embryo, the adversarial system fails to fully reveal the 
progenitors’ intentions. First, the context in which embryo disputes 
arise complicate the courts’ ability to discover the progenitors’ inten-
tion with respect to the disposition of their embryos. The majority of 
progenitors do not create written agreements regarding the disposi-
tion of their embryos when they undergo IVF treatments.254 This re-
quires courts to find intent from informed consent forms.255 The use 
of such forms is problematic because most progenitors perceive these 
as agreements with the IVF clinic and not as binding agreements be-
tween each other.256 Further, the majority of informed consent docu-
ments are entered into without the advice of counsel and are generic 
forms which do not explicitly address the many possible contingen-
cies that may face the progenitors during the IVF treatment proc-
ess.257 
 Second, intention is a transmutable concept. Courts struggle with 
when to consider intent—when the IVF process begins or when the 
disposition event is to take place.258 Issues such as whether to con-
sider evidence outside of the contract raise similarly complicated 
questions that have not been uniformly resolved.259 Because of the 
private nature of any agreements between progenitors, usual rules of 
contract interpretation may not provide assistance in examining 
these agreements. 
 Given the difficulties courts face in assessing the progenitors’ in-
tent, an alternative dispute resolution model should be considered. 
Unlike courts, which are bound by principles of contract interpreta-
tion and rules of evidence, other models of dispute resolution do not 
have the same limitations. Further, an alternative dispute resolution 
model which permits the progenitors to define relevant issues and 
determine the role their intention should play in determining the 
disposition of the embryo truly empowers the progenitors as the deci-
                                                                                                                      
 254. See Waldman, supra note 27, at 922-26. 
 255. See id. at 922-23. 
 256. Daar, supra note 92, at 198 (quoting A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (Mass. 
2000), where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the consent form “was 
intended only to define the donors’ relationship as a unit with the clinic”); Waldman, supra 
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 258. Compare In re Marriage of Witten III, 672 N.W.2d 768, 779-83 (Iowa 2003), with 
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-82 (N.Y. 1998). 
 259. See Witten III, 672 N.W.2d at 779-83; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179-82. 
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sionmakers. At the heart of the contract theory model is the rationale 
that progenitors should be autonomous and enabled to define them-
selves through relationships. A model of dispute resolution that has 
less restrictive rules of contract interpretation will provide the pro-
genitors with the ability to make such an autonomous decision.  
V.   A NEW PARADIGM: THE RESOLUTION OF FROZEN EMBRYO 
DISPUTES UNDER AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MODEL 
 Unlike the adversarial process, alternative dispute resolution 
models provide for more flexible decisionmaking.260 This flexibility 
permits parties to consider issues not central to recognized legal in-
terests in the dispute and to arrive at creative solutions not available 
under the adversarial process.261 In the context of embryo disputes, 
the rigidity of the adversarial model generates overly simplistic tests 
to resolve disputes between progenitors over the embryo.262 This Part 
considers whether the previously identified shortcomings of the ad-
versarial model can be remedied through an alternative dispute reso-
lution model. 
A.   Reframing the Legal Status of the Embryo 
 Because the legal status of the embryo dictates the legal rights of 
the progenitors and frames the relevant issues to be considered in 
reaching a resolution to the embryo dispute, the court must resolve 
this issue before rendering a judgment under an adversarial model. 
As discussed in Part II, supra, the majority of courts entertaining 
embryo disputes has resolved that the embryo is property deserving 
of special respect.263 In practice, this status attributes more property-
like characteristics to the embryo than personhood characteristics.  
 The more difficult question is whether the treatment of the em-
bryo as “property-like” has any significance. Most would agree that 
there is something inherently objectionable about defining an embryo 
as pure property. The embryo, while not human life,264 represents the 
potential for new human life and is a reminder of our collective hu-
manity.265 Professor John Robertson explains that because of these 
                                                                                                                      
 260. See generally Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 429-31 (1986). 
 261. EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE 
ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 4 (1997). 
 262. See supra Part III. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 56-64. 
 264. But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Regular Sess. 
Acts) (attributing personhood to the embryo). 
 265. Robertson, supra note 4, at 447 (“Precisely because the early embryo is genetically 
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the unique gift of human existence.”). 
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attributes, the embryo serves as a “symbol” of human life.266  Thus, as 
a symbol of life, the embryo deserves special respect or treatment by 
courts and legislatures.267  
 Collectively, we may agree that the relatively hollow designation 
of frozen embryos as a special form of property is the best solution 
given the difficulties with assigning a legal status to the embryo and 
the ramifications of any designation as pure property or personhood. 
The more troubling aspect of the “special respect” designation, how-
ever, is that it is set against a backdrop of highly emotionally 
charged individual beliefs about the nature of the origin of human 
life.268 Some progenitors are likely to be of the opinion that the em-
bryo is human life and would strongly oppose any solution to the em-
bryo dispute which is premised on the assumption that the embryo is 
property, especially those solutions which would result in the de-
struction of the embryo.269  
 Recognition of individual beliefs about the nature of the embryo, 
however, is not possible under an adversarial model of dispute reso-
lution. In an adversarial model, the court must determine the nature 
of the rights of all those involved in the dispute before attempting to 
adjudicate the dispute.270 Because the nature of the progenitors’ 
rights is linked the status of the embryo, the court must attribute, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly, a legal status to the embryo. At a mini-
mum, the court must reject those designations that would conflict 
with the determination it reaches regarding which progenitor is to be 
awarded the embryo.271 For example, while a progenitor may indi-
vidually believe that the embryo is human life, the court must reject 
such a determination if it is to award the embryo to another progeni-
tor who seeks to have the embryo discarded.272 Future embryo dis-
putes would be resolved under this legal precedent, requiring the 
court to enforce its prior determination of the legal status of the em-
bryo even in the face of disagreement by both progenitors.  
 Because the adversarial model requires a determination of the le-
gal status of the embryo but has failed to provide a meaningful 
status for embryos generally and has constrained individual views of 
the embryo, a new model of dispute resolution should be considered 
to resolve embryo disputes. Embryo disputes should be resolved 
through a form of dispute resolution that is not dependent upon a 
                                                                                                                      
 266. Id. (“Because it stimulates consciousness of the human community more directly 
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 268. Coleman, supra note 74, at 107-09; see Robertson, supra note 4, at 444-50. 
 269. Robertson, supra note 4, at 444. 
 270. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 261, at 4. 
 271. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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general determination of the embryo’s legal status. Rather, these 
disputes should be resolved under a model that permits the progeni-
tors to introduce their personal notions about the nature of the em-
bryo as they determine the appropriate disposition of the embryo.273 
By providing progenitors with a model of resolution that permits 
them to express their own personal opinions about the nature of the 
embryo, true “special respect” is afforded to the embryo. After all, it 
is the progenitors who likely will use the embryo to achieve a preg-
nancy and will be charged with the responsibilities associated with 
parenthood.274 Enabling progenitors to define the nature of the em-
bryo and attribute to it those characteristics of personhood or prop-
erty the progenitors find deserving promotes the embryo as a symbol 
of potential humanity and optimizes the social desire to accord re-
spect to the perpetuation of humanity.  
 In addition to permitting progenitors the opportunity to introduce 
their individual beliefs regarding the nature of the embryo into the 
dispute resolution process, the rejection of an adversarial model of 
resolution for embryo disputes will minimize the effect of precedent 
on future cases.275 As no legal determination of the status of the em-
bryo is needed to resolve the dispute, there is no precedential impact 
to the resolution of any individual embryo dispute. Different progeni-
tors can resolve the embryo dispute without regard to resolutions in 
prior embryo disputes by other progenitors. 
 Finally, searching for a new dispute resolution model to resolve 
embryo disputes recognizes the symbolic nature of the embryo on a 
societal level. By recognizing the need to depart from traditional ad-
versarial models of dispute resolution, the embryo is truly provided 
“special respect.” 
B.   Correcting Presumptions of the Progenitors and the Right to 
Parenthood and Procreation 
 The adversarial process limits the scope of relevant interests in-
volved in the embryo dispute to those consistent with current notions 
of constitutionally protected interests in privacy.276 Because a court, 
under an adversarial model, is bound to render its decision in a 
                                                                                                                      
 273. See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 261, at 4 (discussing the advantages of alterna-
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manner consistent with constitutional notions of the right to procrea-
tion, it may not consider the individual progenitor’s interests in the 
embryo dispute which are inconsistent with these recognized privacy 
interests. 
 The recognition of the progenitor’s interest in procreation, while 
assisting courts to frame the dispute, has not provided for uniformity 
in the resolution process. As discussed above, there are varying in-
terpretations of the nature of the interest in procreation and the 
point at which the interest is implicated.277 The majority of the con-
flicting interpretations of the right to procreation in embryo disputes 
can arguably be traced back to the difficulties with framing the legal 
status of the embryo and the inability of the court to answer clearly 
the question of what is the origin of human life.278 
 In addition to these limitations, focusing on the interest in pro-
creation limits consideration of other interests the progenitors may 
have in the resolution of the embryo dispute. Some interests, such as 
an individual progenitor’s belief that the embryo is human life or 
that the embryo should be awarded based on the significance of the 
physical contribution or emotional attachment to the embryos, are 
interests closely held by the progenitors that will not be considered 
by the court under an adversarial model.279 The court must reject 
these interests because they have no legal basis.280 Other interests, 
such as one progenitor’s reliance on the other progenitor’s agreement 
to undergo IVF, are too difficult for the court to assess.281  
 An additional limitation of the adversarial process is its failure to 
recognize and adjust to the possible tensions created by the prior re-
lationship of the progenitors and their decision to undergo IVF 
treatment. As discussed above, it is difficult for a court to pinpoint, 
after the relationship between the progenitors has deteriorated, the 
basis for each progenitor’s decision to undergo IVF.282 Because the 
decision to undergo IVF treatment may be emotionally charged, it 
may be the product of coercion by the partner progenitor.283 Further, 
progenitors turning to IVF treatment because of a life event that may 
eliminate future ability to achieve genetic parenthood284 may have re-
lied on the promise of a partner progenitor to continue IVF treatment 
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until pregnancy is achieved. Courts that award an embryo to one 
progenitor over the objection of the other without recognition of these 
potential issues do so in spite of possible coercion and without any 
weight given to the reliance of the progenitors on the completion of 
the IVF process. 
 Because the adversarial model fails to fully address the interests 
a progenitor has in the embryo dispute and fails to account for the 
emotional aspects of the progenitor’s procreative choice, a different 
model of dispute resolution should be considered for embryo disputes. 
Under a different form of dispute resolution, the parties may direct 
the disposition of the embryo in light of the nature of their interests 
in the dispute as they perceive them to be. For example, a progenitor 
may consider her interests in procreation, parenthood and personal 
autonomy in addition to other interests.285 Moreover, the progenitors 
can determine which interest they consider to be of primary impor-
tance in the determination of what to do with the embryos in dispute. 
For example, the progenitor may have strong religious beliefs and 
would consider the destruction of the embryo an immoral act.286 
While the court does not consider these interests directly because 
they are not traditionally considered to be implicated in decisions 
pertaining to embryos, the parties can choose to make decisions re-
garding the embryo that are consistent with other interests they may 
feel take precedence—such as religious beliefs or inability to conceive 
biological children in any other way.287  
 Further, by freeing the embryo dispute from the confines of the in-
terest in procreation, the individual progenitor’s ability to make per-
sonal decisions regarding procreation will be better protected. The 
interest in procreational autonomy will be better served because the 
progenitors will be empowered as the decisionmakers and they will 
maintain the control over the embryo—the creation from their ge-
netic material. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Given the nature of the dispute and the issues to be resolved, the 
adversarial model is a particularly ineffective form of dispute resolu-
tion for embryo disputes. To render its decision, the court must first 
define the legal status of the embryo and identify the appropriate 
role of the progenitors. The courts, as is reflected in the divergent in-
terpretations of the legal status of the embryo and the progenitors’ 
interests, however, do not easily arrive at these determinations. 
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alternative dispute resolution is that “the parties control the result, which can be com-
pletely inconsistent with prevailing substantive legal rules”). 
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While consistently reiterating the need to recognize special respect 
for the embryo and the equality of the progenitors’ rights to control 
the disposition of the embryo, the adversarial model fails to provide 
such recognition to either the embryo or the progenitors. Rather, the 
adversarial model interposes a primarily property-like view of the 
embryo, despite the progenitors’ individual beliefs about the nature 
of the embryo. The adversarial model also removes the decisionmak-
ing authority from the progenitors while simultaneously promoting 
the interest of the progenitor seeking to discard the embryo over the 
interest of the other progenitor. 
 In addition to defining the legal status of the embryo and the roles 
of the progenitors, the adversarial model requires the parties’ rele-
vant interests in the dispute to be identified and considered. The em-
bryo dispute, unlike other property disputes, implicates the complex 
interest in procreation. Forced to evaluate the progenitors’ right to 
procreation in the unique setting of an embryo dispute, courts have 
failed to provide consistent or accurate interpretations of the interest 
in procreation and the relationship of this interest to the interest in 
parenthood. 
 The failings of the adversarial model can be remedied by resolving 
embryo disputes under an alternative dispute resolution model. By 
rejecting the rigid framework of the adversarial model, the progeni-
tors can be permitted to control and define the relevant issues and 
interject their own understandings of the nature of the embryos and 
their interests in their disposition. Further, an alternative dispute 
resolution model would be more consistent with the current princi-
ples understood by the courts in the adversarial model because the 
embryo will be accorded respect by permitting the progenitors to con-
trol its disposition in a manner consistent with their interests. 
